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Abstract  
 
A previous article in this journal,[1] offered a view of limb apraxia rooted in  a traditional 
ideational-ideomotor-limb kinetic taxonomy. This note presents an alternative perspective.  It 
argues that apraxia is better understood in terms of breakdown of constituent components  
of action semantics and spatiotemporal-kinematic control. Such accounts are more 
compatible with models of CNS functioning. Clinically, because diagnosis is based on 
recognising underlying breakdowns, the approach enables a focus on what an individual can 
and cannot do, with direct implications for rehabilitation. This contrasts with earlier practice 
where diagnosis relied on categorisation of derailments and assignment to apraxia subtypes 
not supported by neuropsychological or neurophysiological research and where error types 
claimed to distinguish subtypes showed multiple underlying causes.  
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A VIEW OF APRAXIA 
A previous exposition of apraxia,[1] offered an account of underlying impairment and 
accompanying clinical assessment based on a distinction between ideational, ideomotor  
and limb-kinetic apraxia. This conceptualisation stems from 19th century models of higher 
cortical motor, language and visual function, revived by Geschwind,[2, 3] in the 1960s. 
Liepmann,[4] posited a hierarchical model of action control over three discrete levels. At the 
top, movement formulae (‘visual engrams’ of the action) provided overall targets. These 
activated innervatory patterns to stimulate the appropriate muscles. Coordinated contraction 
of muscles led to execution of the action. Impairment of movement formulae or their 
disconnection from the innervatory patterns brought about ideational apraxia. Disruption to 
innervatory patterns resulted in ideomotor apraxia. Limb-kinetic apraxia, assumed to be a 
disruption to the smooth neural transmission of the motor commands, was even for 
Liepmann not a full apraxia. It existed between apraxia and paresis only within a broader 
view of dysfunction.  
 
Liepmann’s model proved valuable in studying apraxia. However, despite its survival in 
several neurology textbooks, the ideational-ideomotor dichotomy has been replaced as a 
way of understanding and classifying apraxias,[5-8], similar to the disbandment of Broca’s vs 
Wernicke’s aphasia or the dichotomy of associative vs apperceptive agnosia,[9] (though 
these distinctions, too, still persist in some areas of clinical practice). Issues with the 
underlying theoretical model of apraxia and difficulties in distinguishing between ideational 
and ideomotor clinically led to a radical rethink, with Goldenberg,[7, p 332] making the plea 
to ‘relegate the dichotomy of ideational  and ideomotor to the history of neuropsychology’. 
Limb-kinetic apraxia should not be thought a pure apraxia, but rather considered a primary 
sensory-motor dysfunction. In patients with ‘limb-kinetic apraxia’ conceptual planning is 
intact, the contextual variability of apraxia is lacking and the clumsiness observed varies 
depending on fine motor coordination complexity rather than psychomotor complexity. It is 
confined to distal control and is typically unilateral,[10].  
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Problems inherent to the ideational -ideomotor (dis)connection model were several. What 
constituted ‘visual engrams’ and ‘innervatory patterns’, and the relationship between them, 
was at the very least highly underspecified, at worst misguided. The same applied to how 
‘engrams’ and ‘innervation’ might relate to actual brain/CNS function. Clinically, the model 
forced clinicians to categorise a patient’s problem as either ideational or ideomotor apraxia. 
As these categories were derived from a theoretical rather than an experimental model many 
patients showed difficulties that did not conform to the classification. Furthermore, 
classification rested on observed behaviours (e.g. altered proximity, body part as object, 
wrong grasp) that might have multiple different underlying causes.  
 
ANOTHER VIEW OF APRAXIA 
Alternative perspectives see action planning and control arising from highly interactive, 
integrated neurophysiological and neuropsychological networks, as opposed to hierarchical 
discrete level formulations. Accounts have highlighted control networks distributed across 
the left hemisphere,[11-15], stressing interaction on the one hand with visual and tactile-
kinaesthetic perception and feedback, on the other with subcortical, especially 
extrapyramidal, elements of motor control in initiation, timing, rhythm, force of movements.  
At their core, alternative accounts see action planning and control as consisting of and 
dependent on multiple underlying processes. If one could identify these building blocks of 
control and how they interact, then one could analyse apraxic behaviour in terms of which 
underlying factor(s) is at fault. This would enable diagnosis of what a person can or cannot 
do in terms of preservation-impairment of elements of action semantics and spatiotemporal 
control (see below), rather than assignment to some general category label which provides 
no specification of the individual’s problem. It would enable rehabilitation to target root 
causes directly rather than deliver intervention based on broad categories that may or may 
not apply to the individual and directed at derailments that may have multiple underlying 
causes.  
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The quest was therefore to uncover constituents of action planning and control that operated 
independently of each other within the interactive networks, but that were also compatible 
with and demonstrated transparent links to underlying neurophysiological 
processes/networks.  
 
Starting point for building alternative models were systematic observations and testing out of 
apraxic behaviour to search for components of action that could break down independently 
of each other,[16-23]. Such studies have highlighted, for instance, individuals who can name 
objects (so no visual agnosia or aphasia), but are unable to state their use, and/or 
demonstrate their application. Others, despite recognising usage show an inability to 
pantomime the action but faultless performance when they handle the object. Another may 
describe an object and correctly conjecture how it might be employed, but not discern its 
exact function. Others attempt usage but show wrongly configured grasp, application to the 
wrong target of the action (e.g. wrong body part, other object), or inappropriate execution 
(e.g. stirs tea with a dunking motion). Part-actions (e.g. finger, elbow, shoulder  extension-
flexion) may be possible in isolation but when control of the multiple degrees of freedom 
across these joints is necessary simultaneously (e.g. to reach, pick up a glass, bring it to the 
lips) movements may occur incompletely, out of phase, with trial and error attempts, and so 
forth.  
 
Clinically, too, one would proceed via systematic evaluation across modes of elicitation (e.g. 
verbal, visual, tactile), contexts of action (e.g. clinic, naturalistic; with-without handling 
objects) and types of gesture (e.g. transitive-intransitive; meaningful-meaningless), which 
aspect(s) of action semantics and planning/control is/are impaired. Through this one aims to 
identify the precise source of difficulty. For example, the source of breakdown in stirring tea 
may relate to: despite correct naming, not recognising what a spoon is for; not establishing  
the association cup-spoon; an inability to appropriately grasp and manipulate the spoon; a 
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contrasts in miming stirring spontaneously compared to imitation, either with and without the 
tea and spoon present, with and without touching them. Elucidation might contrast stirring 
paint (which one would not dunk a biscuit in) and spooning sugar (different grasp and plane 
etc). There are several validated bedside and clinical screening tests that facilitate this,[24, 
25].  
 
Debate continues on which underlying components to action control precisely one should 
seek, but by and large processes have been distilled into elements around action semantics/ 
conceptual components of action (knowledge of function, manipulation knowledge and 
mechanical problem solving,[8, 22, 23, 27]) and kinematic, spatiotemporal constituents of 
control, (coordination of the degrees of freedom across multiple joints and the amplitude, 
trajectory, orientation/plane, spatial proximity/dimensions and relative phasing/timing of 
subparts of actions,[8, 13-15, 26]) .  
 
The dissociations between conceptual components of action and spatiotemporal 
constituents of control in turn have been linked to interacting but dissociable 
neurophysiological networks providing a neuro-anatomical and neurophysiological basis for 
this approach,[11-13, 15, 22].  Dorsal-dorsal, dorsal-ventral and ventral neuroanatomical 
streams have been identified linked to the knowing ‘where’ and ‘how’ (dorsal) and ‘what’ 
(ventral) of action control, with further subdivision of the dorsal stream into ‘grasp’ and ‘use’ 
systems,[11, 15]. 
 
This more individual approach has more than theoretical relevance. It identifies the root 
cause(s) of the individual’s difficulty with action, and through this facilitates a more targeted 
rationale for intervention,[28]. It also opens up the possibility to explore different 
characteristic profiles of praxic breakdown across neurological disorders,[29].  
 
Declaration of interest: the author has no declarations of competing interest. 
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